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External and internal security have a cost: Countries must pay or suffer

2023-10-04 21:32:00, Blog Edward Lucas

Europeans scoffed when Donald Trump called them "evildoers" over their insufficient contributions to NATO. That strong statement made the Atlantic Alliance, based for decades on sacred values ??and shared sacrifices, sound like a band offering protection in exchange for payment.

But the previous (and perhaps the next) president of the USA was right on one point. National security is like an insurance policy: for risks we cannot afford, he who pays a little saves a lot. But so are guarantees. And guaranteeing national security is a good deal for Europeans.

The Americans are leading the alliance and maintaining nuclear weapons, military space programs, long-range strikes, combat stocks, and other costly capabilities that make deterrence credible.

In return, Europeans are supposed to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense and provide support for major global issues. But the policy is failing. For years Europeans have put other interests ahead of national security (especially cheap Russian gas and low-cost manufacturing in China).

They neglected defense. Although that approach is changing, a large portion of American voters have run out of patience with European leaders. What's worse, China is now the number one threat while Europe is once again standing idly by.

On paper, Europeans can fend for themselves. The GDP of European NATO members is about $20 trillion (US national income is $23 trillion). But even assuming the necessary political will exists, turning money into military influence takes time.

So, even under the most unrealistically optimistic assumptions, it would take the Europeans at least a decade to replace the American security umbrella. If not completely disintegrated after a defeat in Ukraine, Russia could rebuild its military and pose a major challenge within the next 2 years.

Therefore, the most urgent task for the Europeans is to better share their burdens and make themselves more useful to the United States elsewhere, primarily in dealing with China. The EU's economic weight, rule-making power and diplomatic influence are important and likely decisive assets, because the rivalry is not just military.

The party-state in China is fighting for dominance in areas such as the control of personal data, information flows and the setting of technological standards. Transatlantic and transpacific cooperation between the US and its allies can work: just look at how it broke Huawei's seemingly inexorable grip on 5G telephony. Next is vital minerals, microchips and drones.

This implies a broad revision of the current approach. In the last 3 decades, our political and economic model has included businesses that prioritize shareholder returns over national security. In fact, we need a new type of political risk insurance, mitigating not specific disruptions (war, nationalization), but potential supply chain threats and the risk of leakage of sensitive data and technologies. We did this during the Cold War. And we have to learn to do it again. National security policy has two other elements: public trust and social cohesion. Both of these are vulnerable to external malefactors (Russia specializes in polarizing opinion), or can be damaged due to economic, cultural, etc. problems.

It is true that the arguments for moving jobs abroad, mass immigration and weaker public services can be very strong. New technology, climate change and other big trends make shocking changes inevitable. But people who don't like all this can express themselves by voting.

And when they are ignored, citizens can express their displeasure by electing anti-establishment "populist" politicians or supporting supposedly anti-establishment causes such as Brexit. Dismissing these voters as traitors, fanatics or idiots only increases their distance from traditional parties. The fact that this affects both the United States and Europe only underscores the consequences for national security. / " Center for European Policy Analysis " - Translated and adapted by CNA