The illusion of easy wars

2026-03-28 12:51:00, Blog Massimo Nava

From Vietnam to Afghanistan, to Iran and Ukraine. When conflicts, underestimated, defy predictions

“Pyrrhic victory” is a popular expression to describe a success in battle, achieved at such a high cost that it soon turns into a defeat. History is full of examples of wars that began with victorious battles but ended badly, as well as of conflicts won, the economic and human cost of which was then paid for by entire generations.

In school, we study the Napoleonic Wars and the disastrous Russian campaign, the long and unpredictable resistance of Troy, the wars of conquest of Alexander the Great, which ended badly after the hero's sudden death. In more recent times, we can recall the failed military operations of the United States in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, to ??which Iran will most likely have to be added. The same considerations apply to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, intended four years ago as a safe walk towards regime change in Kiev, but which turned into an endless war of positions, with hundreds of thousands killed.

The moral is quite simple, and it is surprising that politicians and military strategists continue to take it so little into account. It is as if the certainty of one's own military superiority and the political or ideological "nobility" of motives automatically provide the keys to success, preferably rapid.

In reality, no war continues and ends according to the scenario with which it was conceived and launched. The variables, the means and forms of enemy resistance, the ability of the attacked population to adapt, the meteorological conditions, the reaction of domestic public opinion, the underestimation of the opponent's arsenal, can be endless. They subvert strategies and force changes along the way, which sometimes complicate the situation even more.

In Iran, Washington and Tel Aviv think they are fighting a state, an army, and a regime that they have, in a way, already beaten on the head. In reality, they are facing the world's largest parallel militia, trained by decades of foreign and domestic conflicts for endless resistance. Once again, the lessons of the post-9/11 war on terror, which ended in the disasters of Afghanistan and Iraq, seem to have failed.

The American-led coalition in 2003 overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime for a few weeks, but then sank into the terrorist quagmire that shook Iraq and spread to Syria. Regime change in Kabul ended with the return of the Taliban and the catastrophic withdrawal of American forces, ordered by President Joe Biden. Today, in Iran, Donald Trump has been drawn into a strategic failure by Israel, which pursues different objectives and in opposition to Washington. The massive bombings and assassinations of regime figures have undoubtedly weakened the country, but it remains an illusion to talk about surrender. This is because the weight of the "state militia", the Pasdaran, militarily weaker, but trained for resistance and capable, as has been seen, of paralyzing the world energy market, has been underestimated.

Moreover, they control the domestic energy market, the military apparatus, and the traffic that arises from sanctions. An internal uprising may still be possible, but in the face of the Pasdaran network, the risk of a catastrophic civil war is extremely high.

On the Ukrainian front, the war has entered its fifth year and there is still no possible way out. Here too, it is worth reflecting on what factors, beyond military force, can influence the outcome of a war.

In Ukraine, not only Russian President Vladimir Putin, but the vast majority of politicians, analysts and commentators overestimated Russian military power and underestimated that of Ukraine. Socio-political factors are often left out of the calculation of the risks of starting a conflict. As a result, Russia, considered a great power, should have quickly defeated the smaller Ukrainian power. In reality, it turned out that Ukraine, with the support of Western weapons, perhaps not foreseen by the Kremlin, developed a great capacity for resistance and patriotic sacrifice, while the Russian superpower was forced to change its battle plans along the way, after realizing major material and strategic shortcomings.

History leaves us with a long list of failed attempts at regime change and the export of democracy. It makes you wonder whether leaders have complete and reliable information, whether the circle of advisors truly responds to the interests of the nation, whether the intelligence services always do their job, or whether, as has sometimes happened, they are bypassed to suit the whims of the boss. / Corriere della Sera – Bota.al